Interview: Russophobia and the Politics of Fear – An Analysis of Historical and Contemporary Dynamics

Unraveling the Historical and Ideological Roots of Russophobia in Western Politics

Paulo Fernando de Barros 05/18/2025

In a recent interview hosted by Professor Glenn Diesen, Lord Robert Skidelsky, a distinguished professor emeritus of political economy and member of the UK House of Lords, offered a compelling analysis of Russophobia—an irrational fear of Russia that has shaped Western foreign policy for centuries. Drawing from Skidelsky’s insights, as articulated in his article in The Nation titled “Russophobia: An Epidemic Disease,” this article explores the historical roots, ideological underpinnings, and contemporary implications of Russophobia. Skidelsky argues that while legitimate security concerns about Russia exist, descending into irrational fear distorts policy, undermines diplomacy, and jeopardles perpetual conflict. This phenomenon, far from novel, echoes sentiments from the 19th century and remains a potent force in today’s geopolitics.

The Historical Genesis of Russophobia

Russophobia, as Skidelsky defines it, is an irrational fear of Russia rooted in its vast size, perceived autocratic governance, and historical rivalry with the West. The term gained traction in the 19th century, with thinkers like John Stuart Mill in 1836 and Richard Cobden, who published a pamphlet titled The Cure for Russophobia, critiquing the exaggerated fears of Russian expansionism. A century later, John House Gleason’s book The Genesis of Russophobia further traced these anxieties to ideological and geopolitical tensions.

Skidelsky highlights that Russophobia has often been framed in moral and ideological terms. In the 19th century, Tsarist Russia was depicted as a barbaric autocracy threatening democratic Europe. This narrative persisted through the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was cast as an existential threat to Western capitalism, institutionalized through NATO’s containment policies. The 1990s offered a brief thaw, with hopes that Russia might integrate into the “civilized world.” However, Russophobia resurged in the 2010s, fueled by events like the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Skidelsky notes that these modern tropes—Russia as an aggressive, expansionist power—are strikingly similar to 19th-century caricatures.

A key historical example is the Crimean War (1853–1856), where moral narratives obscured strategic interests. Russia was cast as the aggressor, the Ottoman Empire as the victim, and Britain and France as altruistic saviors. Skidelsky points out that this framing ignored Britain’s imperial motives, such as protecting India and the Suez Canal from Russian influence. Such moral crusades, he argues, oversimplify complex geopolitical rivalries and justify aggressive policies.

The Ideological and Psychological Dimensions

Skidelsky emphasizes that Russophobia is not merely a response to Russian actions but a psychological and ideological construct. The perception of Russia as a “giant octopus” seeking to dominate reflects deep-seated fears of its size and power. Ideologically, Russia’s autocratic governance has been contrasted with Western democracy, casting it as inherently expansionist. This simplistic dichotomy—autocracy versus democracy—fuels a moral crusade to dismantle autocratic regimes, as articulated in Tony Blair’s 2003 Chicago speech advocating liberal interventionism. Skidelsky critiques this as a “ludicrous” belief in eternal peace through value imposition, arguing that it ignores the anarchic nature of international relations, where clashes of interest are inevitable.

The psychological aspect of Russophobia manifests as a phobia—a term Skidelsky uses deliberately to denote irrationality. Phobias preclude negotiation, as the “other” is deemed inherently malign. This mindset has led to a decade of diplomatic silence between the West and Russia, marked by escalating sanctions rather than dialogue. Skidelsky contrasts this with the approach of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who, despite his flaws, advocated active diplomacy to “stop the killing” in Ukraine. This call for negotiation, Skidelsky suggests, is a rare break from the non-negotiable stance driven by Russophobia.

The Role of Moral Narratives and Imperial Reflexes

Skidelsky identifies Britain as a historical frontrunner in Russophobia, driven by imperial nostalgia and moral reflexes. In the 19th century, Britain’s empire expanded while condemning Russian expansion as barbaric. This double standard—celebrating British imperialism as civilizing while vilifying Russian ambitions—persists in modern rhetoric. Britain’s diminished great power status today amplifies its moral posturing, as it lacks the pragmatic constraints of dealing with Russia as an equal. Skidelsky notes that Britain’s Russophobia is more uncompromising than America’s, with no credible counter-narratives allowed in public discourse.

Moral narratives also shape contemporary conflicts, particularly in Ukraine. Russia is portrayed as the unprovoked aggressor, Ukraine as the innocent victim, and NATO as the disinterested savior. This framing, Skidelsky argues, obscures NATO’s expansionist policies and strategic interests, echoing the Crimean War’s “great game” dynamics. The use of economic sanctions as a modern weapon further reflects this moral repugnance, functioning as an economic blockade to degrade Russia’s war-making capacity without direct military engagement.

Domestic and Global Consequences

Russophobia has profound domestic and global implications. Domestically, it serves as a tool for political manipulation and military spending. Skidelsky cites historical examples, such as the fabricated Zinoviev Letter in 1924, which linked the UK Labour Party to Soviet subversion, toppling the first Labour government. Similarly, the Russiagate scandal aimed to discredit Trump, illustrating how Russophobia can demonize domestic opponents. John Stuart Mill’s 1836 observation that Russophobia justifies military spending remains relevant, as national security narratives loosen fiscal constraints, enabling what Skidelsky terms “military Keynesianism.” This shift prioritizes defense over public services, with the EU and Germany recently relaxing fiscal rules to fund rearmament.

Globally, Russophobia undermines diplomacy and fragments the world into hostile blocs, reversing globalization’s integrative trends. Economic sanctions and the designation of Russia as a “malign actor” disrupt trade and foster protectionism, reminiscent of the 1930s. Skidelsky warns that this division, coupled with cyber warfare fears, risks perpetual conflict and destabilizes the international order.

The Role of Émigré Lobbies and Narrative Construction

Skidelsky highlights the influence of émigré lobbies in perpetuating Russophobia. In the 19th century, Polish and Hungarian exiles in London fueled anti-Russian sentiment. Post-World War II, Ukrainian anti-Soviet émigrés shaped U.S. policy, reinforcing Cold War mentalities. Today, Ukrainian diasporas amplify Russophobic narratives, while anti-Putin Russian émigrés are less influential. Additionally, historical forgeries like the fake Testament of Peter the Great (1797–1798) have linked regional security to Western interests, a tactic echoed in modern claims that Ukraine’s fall would threaten NATO.

The Path Forward

Skidelsky’s analysis underscores that Russophobia, while rooted in historical rivalries, is exacerbated by ideological rigidity and moral crusades. Its persistence undermines national security by prioritizing confrontation over diplomacy, inflating threats, and justifying rearmament. To counter this, Skidelsky advocates for pragmatic engagement with Russia, recognizing that great power conflicts require negotiation, not demonization. The promise of talks in Istanbul, as mentioned in the interview, offers a glimmer of hope, though Russophobia’s deep roots pose a formidable challenge.

As the West navigates its relationship with Russia, Skidelsky’s call for rationality and diplomacy resonates. By acknowledging the irrationality of Russophobia, policymakers can move toward a more balanced approach, fostering security through dialogue rather than fear. Only then can the cycle of perpetual war, driven by moral absolutes, be broken, paving the way for a more stable and cooperative global order.